Five takeaways from the Florida International University Bridge Collapse (A Skilled Trades Perspective)

On March 15, 2018, the pedestrian bridge that was supposed to connect Sweetwater and FIU, collapsed over Southwest Eighth Street and 109th Avenue, killing six and injuring ten. When this story initially broke, it was an instant sensation across social media. People were quick to toss out their opinions about the collapse with little to no evidence. It’s human nature; we are drawn to judge, blame, and point fingers. It’s unfortunate, but true, nonetheless.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Chairman Robert Sumwalt found this accident demonstrated the above all too well. He said, “I don’t think I’ve ever seen one where there’s more finger-pointing between the parties. And you know, the finger-pointing is actually correct. Everybody’s pointing at everyone else.  In fact, that is correct—because everyone shares a piece of this accident. There were errors up and down the line.”

The NTSB chairman, however, has a leg up on the rest of us: the results of an 18 month long investigation determining what likely caused the bridge collapse. Now, the NTSB has published 30 findings for the public to read, study, and learn from.

You can search the NTSBs website for their findings or you can check Engineering News – Record (ENR); they posted the 30 findings of the NTSB here. They are worth looking at since they provide you with not only the findings but also set the stage for the real reason I wanted to write this post. I don’t want to regurgitate what the NTSB found and reported; that news is pretty much out there on numerous websites. Not only was the collapse big news but so was the 18 month long study which is now being released. There are multiple discussions taking place all over, with many of them merely re posting the 30 findings.

I actually didn’t see the ENR website post until after I found out the NTSB had dropped their findings. I, like many others, found out via social media – someone shared a post and next things you know it’s making the rounds. The article I first read about it can be found here.

Important information to glean from the NTSB report

Now, the reason I am pointing this out is two fold. First, the article I read initially had some accompanying pictures which, when you understood what took place, helped put things in perspective. It’s true a picture is worth a thousand words and they add some rich context to the collapse. Second, though, would be the comment section. The very first comment had me hooked, to be honest, not that I stopped reading after just one, though. I’ll endeavor to explain why in this post.

Besides, I don’t was to restate the same 30 things over and over, nor do I want to miss the mark. I looked at this whole accident, study, and findings from a skilled labor perspective. It certainly frames my point of view and I’m inclined to believe a few things based upon the NTSB study and findings. So what are they, exactly? Below I outline five takeaways based upon the evidence – and they are all from a skilled trades perspective.

1. Engineers can – and do – make mistakes; they don’t know everything

Yea, I know what your thinking/saying right now: we already know this. True, many of us who have been in the game for any number of years have experienced this truth a number of times. We’re not talking about something we can’t make fit because an item is in the way, or the professional jealousy sometimes exhibited, though. No, this is different. This particular time, six people lost their lives from mistakes – and this made it very REAL. This wasn’t computer modeling, class sessions, or training; this was real life, with real people, who lost their lives. Six people are no more; a heavy conscious to be sure and not something I would like to have on mine.

While I was writing out what I wanted to say and how this post would look, I was trying to recollect a story I read on a forum some time back. This iron worker noticed something wrong on a job site, took some measurements, and brought the issue to the engineers attention. The engineer listened to him, recognized his error, and thanked him “for saving his stamp.”

Stories like that don’t get out to the public often but those of us in the game have heard our fair share. The public might not know but we do. We have seen the issues, being on the front line; we have noticed discrepancies and changed course, and we have brought recommendations saving time and money. It might not get out that engineers make mistakes but we know all too well.

This isn’t meant to slam engineers – but the truth can sometimes hurt. It seems the mistakes any skilled trades people make get lauded all around (often we are told it is for others to learn from). Those of engineers (or others in the office environment, for that matter), though, often don’t get discussed – if people are made aware of them at all. Instead, it seems like they get swept under the rug, far away from the penetrating light of lessons learned.

Every now and then, though, an accident occurs where there is no recourse – and the facts must come to light. The collapse of the FIU bridge was one such accident. This accident will be studied for years to come. Young engineers will be listening to lectures and contemplating as to why the bridge collapsed. They will run calculations, model simulations, and hold discussion groups on lessons learned. Engineers, by way of accident investigation and external studies, will better grasp the truth that not only can they make mistakes, they sometimes do – and the consequences can be large. And upon ascending that mountain they will discover those of us in the skilled trades, who, by experience, have long known this, to be sitting at the top for years now. We’ve seen it play out and the lesson is for them to learn.

There are reasons for checks and balances

Additionally, it is worthy to segue into the reasons for checks and balances after we acknowledge mistakes can and often are made. As we can certainly see, some mistakes have greater consequences than others and this one was costly, in terms of money and life. Knowing this, certain checks and balances were supposed to be implemented from the beginning to ensure mistakes were caught. This, though, was not the case.

Peer review of the bridge progress was, according the FDOT regulations, supposed to be done at the 30%, 60%, and 90% levels. Louis Berger Group, the engineering firm hired to do the review, ONLY did a review at the 90% stage and the work was done by one engineer – without assistance. And, according the ENR,

“Originally, FIGG had planned on another of its offices performing the peer review, but that was not allowed by FDOT regulations.

Instead, in August 2016, FIGG negotiated with Louis Berger to perform this work. The engineer cut Berger’s fee from the $110,000 it had bid to $61,000, with FIGG informing Berger that nevertheless “the original scope of work remained unchanged,” NTSB reported.

In response to the fee cut, “Louis Berger reduced its timeframe for the project from 10 weeks to 7 weeks, to meet FIGG’s requirements.”

In a post-collapse interview, Berger’s peer-review engineer told NTSB: “In the beginning, I suggested to do this kind of analysis, to analyze the connections. I’m talking about the nodes, or the joints to analyze the connections. However, the budget and time to do this actually was not agreed upon with the designer.'”

ENR’s excellent article with the above in it can be found here.

Checks and balances – peer review failures

It’s my personal opinion FIGG was trying to save money by having one of their own offices perform the peer review. Upon discovering they couldn’t, though, they drastically reduced the amount paid to Louis Berger, constraining them. It’s true they (Louis Berger) should have walked away rather than perform a substandard peer review. You know what that was? Another mistake.

Yet another breakdown on the checks and balances was FIGG’s determination to re-tension the bridge after it had been set – a decision which had not been peer reviewed at all. Perhaps even worse was the attitude of the engineers as cracks began to show themselves on the bridge before it collapsed.

Again, ENR reported that, “on March 13, for instance, just two days before the March 15 collapse, a FIGG design manager twice told MCM that the cracking did not constitute a hazard, stating first, “We do not see this as a safety issue.” Later that same day, the design manager reiterated: “Again, we have evaluated this further and confirmed that this is not a safety issue.”

It’s interesting to note that while they stated they didn’t see it as a safety issue they decided to authorize, without adequate peer review and acceptance, re-tensioning of the bridge to stymie additional cracks and the ones already there.

You know who saw these cracks, took pictures, and warned others of the severity of the cracks? The tradesmen on the bridge.

2. Skilled Tradesmen deserve more credit than we’re given

Several pictures are at the center of and intimately associated with the FIU bridge collapse. For my part, I am extremely grateful for they show just how serious the cracks were prior to the collapse. Until I saw these pictures I had no idea. Pictures may be worth a thousand words but most often they do not do the scene justice – which is, in all likelihood, the case here. Some on the bridge have been reported to have said as much. Again, though, boots on the ground instinctively knew something was amiss. Hence the photos above.

The first article I read after the release of the report captivated me, in large part, because of the comments. I’ll post a couple and you can see what I mean.

The first one follows:

“One of the worse things I see in this report is the ignoring of the construction workers. I’m a good enough engineer to know I don’t know everything. A guy with a high school education that has actually done stuff with his hands and not just on a computer knows a lot more about how things actually work than I do. Some guy sends me an e-mail with a picture like the one with the tape measure in the crack, I’m going to go down there and put my eyes on it and talk to the guys and see what they are thinking is the problem and their ideas of a solution.  Shoot, any engineer worth a damn should be there beside them when the cracks first appear.

I think this is the biggest problem I see with today’s engineers. Great at crunching numbers (although a bit too confident that the computer will get it right). Horrible at communicating with the guys in the field that are building this stuff to get their experience. Engineering school teaches you how to crunch numbers. A salty 60+ year old that is nothing but scars and bad attitude wearing tattered blue coveralls is who teaches you how to be an engineer.   These are the guys that take your dumb ideas and pretty pictures and make them reality.”

I don’t think I need to elaborate on why the above comment is a stellar one, do I? I’m taking him at face value, as it were. Suffice it to say, it’s refreshing to see stock put into tradesmen, their word, and deeds.

Next up:

“*For what it’s worth, I’ve seen construction crews do crazy, seemingly unsafe stuff, a bunch of times. If they are worried enough to take a photo and slow down work, something is up.”

I admit it, I laughed at this one. What some deem crazy is normal to others. Nevertheless, it is a testament of someone recognizing when those who do the work have something to say, they ought to listen.

“Right?? Being a civil engineer myself, if a contractor calls me to say he thinks something is messed up and he’s willing to stop work to fix it then you’d better believe I’m triple checking everything.”

Yet another comment giving credence to those doing the work.

Last up is one I have heard SO MANY people advocate for over the years:

“As someone who grew up in construction and became an engineer, I think every engineer should have to spend a bit of time in the field seeing their design being built. Knowing how it goes together saves a lot of headaches for everyone involved.”

You can find the site where the above comments were found here.

What it all means

I bring the above into the court room as evidence there are some who, possessing some measure of intelligence, recognize those who do the work as indispensable. They are a valuable source of information, advice, and wisdom – and they should be regarded as such.

Thing is though, I don’t have to depend on the above comments for us to know that. It’s intrinsic to most who are in the skilled trades; it’s certainly nice to read but we’ve experienced the opposite. We have seen so many instances over the years where those on the job – who have provided valuable information – have not received credit for it. They were not acknowledged. Their contribution downplayed, input credited to others, their expertise re attributed/stolen, and their field engineering – though vital in many ways – summarily dismissed. Unsung heroes in times of valor.

Don’t get me wrong: I thoroughly enjoy the praise from the comments above and the occasional shout out from others. They just don’t come very often and we definitely don’t expect them. It’s par for the course, overall. Still, it is nice to hear periodically.

Have you ever thought why that is? These may be deep waters, but when I think about it I’m left to attribute it, for our discussion, to at least one thing: you can’t replace wisdom – and that wisdom is being celebrated – if only for a moment. I know enough old timers over the years who would have not only sounded the alarm but called out those who didn’t. They lived through a time when safety was a forgone conclusion, you were your brothers keeper, and your life was in your own hands. Something cataclysmic as the cracks seen above would have prompted attention.

Oh, and here’s the rub: several engineers have reviewed the relevant job information for various entities researching the collapse and have all concluded the same: the problems associated with cracking were NOT normal. The immediate response should have been one of urgency, not complacency. They each express incredulity at the willingness to allow the work to continue.

3. Engineers can – and will – shift blame on skilled trades when they can

Yes, it’s true. I don’t have to rely on personal experience here because this particular job has it plainly for all to see. Recall at the beginning of this post the NTSB chairman commenting on the mass of finger pointing taking place when discussing blame. Well, the bridge designer was pointing their finger – at the crews doing the work.

Not to delve into too many details (as if this post isn’t long already), the engineers (post collapse) said the concrete at node 11/12 should have been roughened up before installation, to help resist shear forces. They attribute the collapse to the crews not roughening up the concrete, which would have increased the strength by as much as 84%. From OSHA’s official report I found the following: “The next question was whether the interface between the two pours was smooth or “intentionally roughened” to a full amplitude of ¼”. The construction documents prepared by FIGG did not specify that the construction joints be “intentionally roughened” with an amplitude of ¼” to provide higher value of shear friction at the junction of the diagonals and the deck, as required by AASHTO.”

FIGG, when interviewed by OSHA, was asked why they didn’t specify the concrete to be “intentionally roughened to a full amplitude of ¼ “”. They tried to say FDOT requirements also stated it but, as OSHA notes with interest, elsewhere FIGG specifically mentioned intentionally roughening up the concrete and did NOT reference FDOT 400.9.3.

The takeaway here? FIGG should have specifically stated it for those doing the work. Furthermore, if it was as important as they state, what documentation do they have, if any, of having stressed it to MCM or others involved? Researching this collapse I have noticed they had meetings ALL THE TIME and from what I can recall I haven’t come across ONE where the intentional roughening of the concrete was important to make note of. FIGG has come out with this reason, but if there were documentation stating they emphasized it, it would be damning. As it is, there is not. You can conclude, then, they had enough faith in their design and noting the concrete needed to be intentionally roughened was, it seems, at least in the grand scheme of things, a minor detail. Essentially, if you understand the final reports you see it for what it really is: an attempt to deflect blame from an under- engineered design to those who have installed it.

Perhaps the under – engineered design would have been caught if a proper review had been done but that was yet another mistake.

ENR reported that, “In a post-collapse interview, Berger’s peer-review engineer told NTSB: “In the beginning, I suggested to do this kind of analysis, to analyze the connections. I’m talking about the nodes, or the joints to analyze the connections. However, the budget and time to do this actually was not agreed upon with the designer.”

If you read the OSHA report, which you can find here, you discover much more information that I want to put here. Summarily, OSHA and the NTSB conclude the bridge design was inadequate and insufficient.

Although FIGG attempted to distribute the blame to multiple parties, both OSHA and the NTSB concluded a structural deficiency beginning at design was at the heart of this collapse.

4. A humble engineer – if found – is worth their weight in gold

I’m relying not only on the comment sections, or the actions of those active on the project, but also on personal experience here.

Most of the engineers I have met over the past two decades are impersonal at best and down right arrogant at worst. That’s not to say I haven’t met others who were great to work with; on the contrary, I have met some really nice engineers who, by their humility, have relied on other experts for advice and direction. Unfortunately, I’m detailing most and most are regarded with an air of superiority. I can think back to a few engineers I’ve met who I couldn’t stand to be around. I did what I could to minimize my time with them because they were pompous and obnoxious.

However, occasionally you get a diamond in the rough: an engineer who possesses some humility. It’s refreshing to see because it’s so counter culture and rare. You know the type: they ask you what your opinions are, how you would approach a job/problem, what you thought about some new technology, etc. This requires humility exercised on their part and that demands vulnerability. Hey, no one knows everything and you put yourself out there by saying that.

My last encounter with a humble engineer was a couple weeks ago. There was a contractor who wanted to install some temporary steel, put in place with tack welds. The specific question was whether it would be enough as there were some concerns of the beam shifting. As a CWI, I advised as to how I would approach the job (weld stops on either side of the temporary angle support to prevent the beam from moving should the tack welds break – which was unlikely) and it was received amicably. All in all, it served to be instructional and not just for this post, either. Every now and then you get a ray of light penetrating the dark arrogance cloud.

Looking back I am sure those in the skilled trades can recollect their experiences with arrogant engineers – much less, though, are the interactions with humble ones. Hopefully, though, we can agree humble engineers are not only more pleasant to deal with but they are also preferable. No one wants to deal with jerks ALL the time. If I can limit my exposure to hostile parties you best believe I will.

Further evidence can be found when you reread the comments posted in takeaway number two. I could have posted them here but I didn’t want to be redundant. In some ways they bleed over into one another and I think we can all see that.

5. An engineer with field experience is the best of both worlds

By now I have woven a thread through this tapestry and it’s time to tie up the post. If you have had the opportunity to work with humble engineers it’s a blessing; working with an engineer who came from the field is down right enjoyable.

They know what it is like to have to deal with field issues, things which shouldn’t be in the way (but are), problems which arise from poor job site conditions, different trades competing for everything else; all the issues that naturally occur on jobs. Having an engineer who has experienced what you have is invaluable. It hones their focus, informs their position, and sharpens their discipline. To those of us who have worked with engineers possessing that experience, we undoubtedly know it makes them better engineers.

I admit to making this the last point for a reason: it’s the rarest. I’ve found some engineers who were humble but rare indeed is the engineer with field experience. Sure, an internship for a year as a field engineer looks good on a resume but for those in the field it doesn’t pass the smell test. No, the experience in the field I’m referring to deals with working in the field as a tradesman. Working in the trades for a number of years and then transitioning to an engineering position. I mean, I’ll take what I can get but field experience is preferred. It’s rare, though; I acknowledge that.

Conclusion

As I wrap up this article, I feel the need to note a few more things and then I’ll have squeezed out all the blood this turnip could offer. First and foremost, there are many more lessons to learn from this tragedy – MANY MORE. I would be delusional to think I alone had the answers, much less everything could be condensed to five takeaways. However, I did have a specific purpose and focus when I began to write this article and I feel the five takeaways did the job quite nicely. After all, I can’t hope to impress a bunch of skilled tradesmen with engineering scenarios and various calculations; it doesn’t become digestible simply because I write it. Writing about specific breakdowns, mistakes that were made, blame that was assigned, and results of investigations; well, now that turns heads.

Second, I really want to emphasize I am not trying to rain down on engineers – because I’m not. Nor am I trying to discourage people from becoming engineers, either; the world needs engineers just as it needs skilled tradesmen. Rather, I am trying to bring a focus to their career, the responsibility which lay at their feet, and also to a rather tragic accident. I’ve heard statistically 90% of all accidents are the result of human failure and this one was no different. Checks and balances are an important part of the process to help catch and eliminate errors. Unfortunately, many of those parameters were not utilized, resulting in a bridge collapse that will be discussed for years to come. So I say let it become an example. If it helps us to prevent another like it then something good will have come from bad, no?

Third, and just as important, this accident really drives home the mantra “see something, say something.” We shouldn’t go blindly around a job site without regard for the dangers surrounding us. They are everywhere and we should act accordingly. Also, we shouldn’t take the work others do for granted, either. As we can all see from the FIU bridge collapse, several people DID see something and they DID say something. Their words, effectively, were silenced by the inaction of others. Their words, silenced as they were, ring out from posterity that we should always say something. This also is a lesson for all of us.

I abhor catastrophes like this; they seem so senseless, worthless, tragic, and downright depressing. It shouldn’t have happened, and the result is six dead and ten injured. Lives forever altered and families left feeling the loss. At the very least, if we can have the courage to own up to the mistakes made, the problems glossed over, and the shortcuts taken, hopefully we can learn from them – and progress forward. We owe it to those who lost their lives as well as the next generation.

Final thoughts

One final though about this whole debacle. Although the conclusion from the NTSB and OSHA state structural deficiencies in the design, the engineers glossed over proper protocol and necessary checks and balances, and group thinking was obviously entrenched in this whole project, this issue could STILL HAVE BEEN PREVENTED. The concrete was telling a tale and screaming it from the rooftops. The skilled tradesmen, and especially those post tensioning, could see the warning – and saw it up close.

The engineer on record saw it too, and not just in pictures. He actually looked at the cracks in person and “it was reported to OSHA during an interview that Denny Pate said that the cracks looked worse than in the pictures.”

What’s more, the engineer couldn’t replicate how the cracks were forming with software and math. To put it plainly, HE DIDN’T KNOW WHERE THE CRACKS WERE COMING FROM. And yet they didn’t order the work to stop given what they knew – and more importantly, what they DIDN’T KNOW. Make no bones about it: THAT IS DAMNING.

To be sure, we are left with a thousand questions even after the reports. Still, for my own personal satisfaction, I would like to know exactly why FIGG didn’t immediately halt work and have the bridge shored up until they could at least figure out where the cracks were coming from – and how to stop them. I don’t care how you try to serve it up but 8″ deep cracks are structural and compromised the integrity of the bridge, as we unfortunately saw. I surmise it was a pride issue but I won’t hold my breath as we wait – for silence is likely all we’ll hear.

 

Additional links

• The full OSHA report can be found here.
• ENR article titled “NTSB’s FIU Bridge Collapse Investigation Finds Many Problems” can be found here.
• ENR article titled ” Final Collapse Report Details Miami Bridge Team Failures” can be found here.
• The Miami Herald article, “Cracks in FIU bridge grew to ‘shocking’ size days before collapse, new photos show,” is located here.
• Jalopnik article, “Florida Pedestrian Bridge Collapse The Result Of Bad Math And Ignoring Giant Cracks: Feds” is found here.
• NTSB final report can be found here.